By Andrew Benjamin
Greek existence, it may be argued, was once outlined by means of the interconnection of position, commonality and judgment. equally in the Continental philosophical culture subject matters similar to position, judgment, legislations and commonality have had a pervasive centrality. Works by way of Jacques Derrida and Giorgio Agamben among others attest to the present exigency of those subject matters. but the ways that they're interrelated has been slightly mentioned in the context of old Philosophy. The conjecture of this publication is that not just are those phrases of actual philosophical significance of their personal correct, yet also they are important to historic Philosophy. Andrew Benjamin eventually hence goals to underscore the relevance of historical Philosophy for modern debates in Continental Philosophy.
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During this very important and hugely unique e-book, position, commonality and judgment give you the framework in which works significant to the Greek philosophical and literary culture are usefully positioned and reinterpreted. Greek existence, it may be argued, was once outlined through the interconnection of position, commonality and judgment.
In seinen neueren Veröffentlichungen tritt Jürgen Habermas immer wieder als prominenter Kritiker von Naturalismus und Szientismus auf. Er will die kommunikative Vernunft vor ihrer Reduktion auf die instrumentelle bewahren, ohne dabei hinter die Voraussetzungen dessen zurückzufallen, used to be er nachmetaphysisches Denken nennt.
Extra info for Place, Commonality and Judgment: Continental Philosophy and the Ancient Greeks
Of the many, three of these possibilities are central. The first involves the identification of the ‘wise’; the second is the evocation of a relationship between commonality, order and justice, and then finally there is the presentation of the world in terms of order. While what is regulative pertains both to ‘the Gods’ (theous) as well as ‘humans’ (anthropóus), this recognition of the regulative is not the province of the Gods, let alone of humans in opposition to the Gods. That recognition is clearly defined in relation to ‘wisdom’.
That move is itself predicated upon the original status of being-in-common and being-in-place as the already present condition of human being. 22 Such an eventuality would depend upon the possibility of locating the presence of human being as originally singular and independent – a move that would be the reduction of human being to a human being, a reduction denying the inherent relationality that defines human being. The second point is that once it can be conceded that measure and order are original, and this is a position that has already been noted in Plato and as will be seen is also present in Heraclitus, Pindar and Sophocles (remembering that they comprise just three possible moments), then what matters is the way in which that originary status is operative.
Not only does this fragment contain a definition of wisdom, namely, listening to the logos, but it also contains a linguistic play – as many commentators point out – between logos and homologein. The play has important consequences as it positions agreement – such that agreement is defined as that speaking which takes place in accord with the logos. The ground of agreement therefore does not depend upon the individual. Even at this early stage, it is perhaps possible to define wisdom as acting 46 Place, Commonality and Judgment in accordance with that which occurs, or takes place, kata ton logon.