By Alfred Schutz (auth.), Maurice Natanson (eds.)
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During this vital and hugely unique ebook, position, commonality and judgment give you the framework during which works principal to the Greek philosophical and literary culture are usefully situated and reinterpreted. Greek existence, it may be argued, was once outlined via the interconnection of position, commonality and judgment.
In seinen neueren Veröffentlichungen tritt Jürgen Habermas immer wieder als prominenter Kritiker von Naturalismus und Szientismus auf. Er will die kommunikative Vernunft vor ihrer Reduktion auf die instrumentelle bewahren, ohne dabei hinter die Voraussetzungen dessen zurückzufallen, was once er nachmetaphysisches Denken nennt.
Extra resources for Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality
38-63. 26 Max Scheler, Die Wissensformen und die Gesellschaft, Problem~ einer Soziologie des Wissens, Leipzig, 1926, pp. 58ff. Cf. Howard Becker and Helmut Dahlke, '~Max Scheler's Sociology of Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. II, 1942, pp. 310-22, esp. 315. 14 METHODOLOGY the in-group. This includes ways of life, methods of coming to terms with the environment, efficient recipes for the use of typical means for bringing about typical ends in typical situations. The typifying medium par excellence by which socially derived knowledge is transmitted is the vocabulary and the syntax of everyday language.
Whether overt or covert, all action has its horizons of relatedness with social reality. As Dr. " So it is with every action. To perform or reperform the "same" action presupposes a typification deeply rooted in common-sense life, which Husserl calls the idealization of "I-can-do-it-again," that is, as Dr. " The basic typification involved here underlies as well the structure of my biographical situation and my stock of knowledge at hand. And since action presupposes the situation of the actor, the initial constitution of "my" world is grounded in the typicality with which I handle the data of my experience.
George H. Mead's distinction between the "I" and the "me" aspects of the self is quite relevant here, as Dr. Schutz points out. For Mead, the "I" is always the subject of any action, the "me" the object. The relationship between the two is highly dialectical, for the self is continually involved in action in which both aspects appear. This dialectic is also a temporal one: the "I" as subject of a present action may become the "me" reflected upon in a later phase of conduct. Quite apart from the theory of the social genesis of the self which Mead develops, however, the problem of the "I" and "me" aspects of the self leads to a conception of the fragmentation of the ego.