By Greg Frost-Arnold
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During this very important and hugely unique booklet, position, commonality and judgment give you the framework in which works principal to the Greek philosophical and literary culture are usefully positioned and reinterpreted. Greek lifestyles, it may be argued, used to be outlined by means of the interconnection of position, commonality and judgment.
In seinen neueren Veröffentlichungen tritt Jürgen Habermas immer wieder als prominenter Kritiker von Naturalismus und Szientismus auf. Er will die kommunikative Vernunft vor ihrer Reduktion auf die instrumentelle bewahren, ohne dabei hinter die Voraussetzungen dessen zurückzufallen, used to be er nachmetaphysisches Denken nennt.
Extra info for Carnap, Tarski, and Quine at Harvard: Conversations on Logic, Mathematics, and Science
For C hwistek , t he axio m of extensio n al i ty is: “ a ny two p roposi t io n al f u nct io ns t hat ag ree i n extensio n are iden t ical ” ( C hwistek 1935 / 1949, 133). 26. C hwistek ’s character izat io n of se m a n t ics is n o n-st a n dard: for h i m , se m a n t ics is “ t he st u dy of t he str uct u ral a n d co nstr uct io n al p roper t ies of exp ressio ns ( p r i m ar i ly of m at he m at ics) ” ( C hwistek 1935 / 1949, 83). T h is is m uch closer to what we (a n d m ost of C hwistek ’s co n te m porar ies) wou ld co nsider syntax.
1, Carnap assimilates the finitist-nominalist endeavor to his work on the semantics of scientific language and relation between observational and theoretical languages, which began explicitly in 1936 with “Testability and Meaning” and continued well after 1941, to “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts” and beyond (Carnap 1956b). , non-Millian) empiricist view of mathematics appeared possible. For this reason, the finitist-nominalist project involves the notion of analytic truth, the issue that perhaps looms largest in historical hindsight.
However, two letters he writes to Carnap in the 1940s provide hints about the meaning Quine attaches to ‘intelligibility’ during this period. In a 1947 letter to Carnap, Quine writes that he considers an ‘exclusively concrete ontology’ intelligible: I am not ready to say, though, that when we fix the basic features of our language. . our guiding consideration is normally convenience exclusively. , some vague but seemingly ultimate standard of intelligibility or clarity. (Creath 1990, 410) Two points about this quotation are relevant for present purposes.